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Introduction 
 
This paper seeks to assess the experience of the social partnership era in Irish 
industrial relations (IR). It will focus on the implications for unions and IR actors 
generally of the distinctive mix of voluntarism and institutionalisation represented by 
the social pacts, where a ‘problem-solving approach designed to produce consensus’ 
has been adopted, and an open-method of coordination, emphasising ‘soft’ regulation 
rather than hard law has been preferred to a Continental approach relying on laying 
down specific rules and procedures. 
 
Section 1 explains how Irish IR actors have attempted to shift from the Anglo-Saxon 
model of IR to a more Europeanised model, highlights the legal position of Irish trade 
unions and outlines briefly the form and content of the SPAs (Social Partnership 
Agreements) to date. Section 2 will then show how the SPAs represent a new form of 
public policy making and administration, based on ideas of soft law and deliberative 
democracy. Finally, we will look at the implications of this for unions and the Irish IR 
system. 
 
The Europeanisation of Irish Industrial Relations 
 
The Irish IR system has traditionally been based on that of the UK. The main features 
of the Anglo-Saxon model are that it is an adversarial, voluntarist system; by contrast, 
in much of continental Europe the language of ‘social partnership’ is so embedded as 
to be used almost unthinkingly (Hyman, 1995). In the Nordic countries, for example, 
the key focus is on the primacy of consensus as against conflict. The unqualified 
ideological commitment to market liberalism found in Britain and the U.S., too, is not 
matched in most of continental Europe where both social-democratic and Christian-
democratic parties tend to view ‘status’ as well as ‘contract’ as necessary foundations 
of socio-economic life. There is a conceptual and ideological bias towards the 
recognition of collective identities, which is informed and in turn supported by 
politico-legal norms; ‘particularly in the Germanic countries, the articulation between 
state and civil society rests on collective associations’ (ibid: 40).   
 
In terms of legal regulation of the labour market and IR generally, it is common to 
classify national regimes into 3 categories (Teague, 2001): Roman-Germanic (state 
has active and central role in labour market organisation-generally collective 
agreements are extended to all workers in the sector; The Netherlands, France etc); 
Anglo-Saxon (relative absence of state intervention in employment relations, no 
extension of agreements to the non-union workplace); Nordic (comprehensive 
regulation based on voluntary agreements between strong collective organisations 
within the framework a very developed welfare state, eg the Ghent system in 
Denmark). 
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Legal Regimes 
 
Anglo-Saxon Nordic Roman-Germanic 
Relative absence 
of state 
intervention in 
emp rels, no 
extension of 
agreements to 
non-union 
workplace 
Comprehensive 
regulation based 
on voluntary 
agreements 
between strong 
collective 
organisations, 
Highly developed 
welfare state, 
(Ghent system) 
State active and 
central role in LM 
organisation-
generally CAs are 
extended to all 
workers in the 
sector, 
UK, Ire  Sweden, Denmark Germany, The 
Netherlands, 
France 
 
The legal position of Irish trade unions: 
 
 Fundamental principle=voluntarism, absence of legally imposed structure 
 Constitution: Article 40.6.1.iii.protects freedom of association BUT no right to 
recognition, no specific recognition of the right to strike, freedom of 
DISsociation 
 No statutory duty to recognise unions (disputes referred to labour court whose 
recommendations are generally non-binding). High level group under P2000 
set up to examine issue. 
 Result=Code of Practice on Voluntary Dispute Resolution and Industrial 
Relations (Amendment) Act 2001-laberynthine procedure on recognition, key 
is that it remains a voluntary procedure. 
 
The 1980s saw very different trajectories for Ireland and the UK. In the UK, you see 
the Thatcherite attack on the unions. In Ireland, you see a centralisation1 of IR. Since 
1987, Ireland has had 6 centralised agreements: 
Agreement Context Content 
1987-1990 PNR 
 
 
1990-1993 PESP 
1993-1996 PCW 
Crisis, unemployment, 
Thatcher 
 
EMU, jobless growth 
Pay moderation for tax 
concessions 
 
Welfare reform, supply 
side policies 
1996-2000 P2000 
2000-2003 PPF 
Economic boom, full 
employment 
Introduction of 
community and 
voluntary sector, 
Workplace partnership 
2003-2006 SP (*pay 
renegotiated in 18 mnths) 
Gloomy economic 
climate, slowing growth, 
job losses 
Pay deal only for 18 
months, ‘Special 
Initiatives’ 
 
                                                 
1 Although some of the agreements have merely provided a framework within which local level 
bargaining takes place (PESP, PPF etc) 
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So, essentially the agreements offered pay moderation for tax concessions; the 
government contracted to address supply side issue (training, infrastructure) with the 
social partners and to reform welfare (health, housing). THE AGREEMENTS ARE 
NOT LEGALLY BINDING. The non-union sector was not covered (MNCs etc) but 
benefited from stable IR/macro economic climate, and the investment in infrastructure 
etc. 
 
Who needs the law? Deliberative Governance and Problem-Solving. 
 
One of the central arguments of this paper is that the SPAs represent a new form of 
public policy making, in which there is a growing awareness of the 
interconnectedness of policy making in different spheres (Goetschy, 2000). Inger-
Johanne Sand (1998) has argued that the globalisation of market economy, 
communicative technologies and other knowledge based structures have contributed 
directly to changes in the organisational patterns of public institutions; ‘the end of 
state monopolies’. Now, public and legal institutions have an increasing number of 
highly diverse and complex tasks. This has resulted in the transformation from a set of 
more or less stable institutions working together as separate but hierarchical 
structures to a system of governance that relies more on the relations and dynamics 
between its institutions; governance is emphasised as dynamic and processural, with a 
thick interdependence between institutions.  
 
SO, in looking at modern governance we see a shift in focus from: 
 
 Institutions > processes and dynamics 
 Separate processes > combinations 
 Institutional continuity > change and DIScontinuity 
 
Furthermore, we see a change in the themes and objects of regulation, where the 
emphasis now is on: 
 
 Specialised knowledge and technology-based discourse 
 Trans-border/trans-institutional forms of communication 
 
These require: 
 
 Co-operation with professional/scientific communities 
 Fact-finding and deliberative methods of decision-making 
 Audits and assessments (monitoring is key) 
 Transparency (public assemblies) 
 
SO, drawing on Cohen and Sabel (1997) we see a shift from aggregative (peoples’ 
interests are given equal weight in reaching a binding decision) to deliberative 
democracy (decisions to be supported by reasons acceptable to others); representative 
(citizens choose legislators to decide on the substance of public policy) to direct 
democracy (citizens authorise public action by deciding on the substance of public 
policy).  
 
Many of these issues feature strongly in the literature on policy making in the 
European Union, particularly in the area of labour market regulation (see, inter alia, 
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Teague, 2001; O ‘Hagan 2002; Pochet and Fajertag, 2000). The EU rarely lays down 
‘tablets of stone’ for national labour law regimes, but nevertheless creates important 
frameworks for the development of domestic employment rules.2 Particularly apposite 
for this paper are the following concepts: 
 
 Engrange: the deepening of interactions between national administrative 
structures and EU institutions, generally played out informally 
 Cosmitology: the use of technical committees and expert policy networks in 
the decision making process. National civil servants meet regularly and so 
begin to define a European policy agenda, a Europeanisation of national 
policy officials 
 
What I wish to emphasise here is the ‘socialisation’ aspect; the positive feedback 
loops associated with repeated interactions. The idea is that actors alter pre-existing 
preferences, expectations and behaviour, with the result that an interdependence is 
forged between governments, social institutions and civic actors. 
 
The argument advanced here is that the Irish social partnership process can be seen in 
a similar light.  
 
Characterisation of Social Partnership (NESC, 1996). 
 
 Combination of consultation, negotiation and bargaining 
 Interdependence between the parties 
 Problem-solving approach designed to produce consensus 
 Involves trade-offs between AND within interest groups 
 Involves a range of participants on various agenda items 
 
O’ Donnell (2000) has identified three dimensions of partnership: functional 
interdependence, bargaining and deal-making (based on traditional social partner 
power), solidarity, inclusiveness and participation (incorporating a variety of different 
viewpoints) and a process of deliberation. The latter is key as it has the potential to 
shape and reshape the parties understanding, identity and preference. Crucial is the 
adoption of a problem-solving approach. A feature of effective partnership is that the 
partners do not debate their ultimate social visions; this means that consensus and 
shared understanding, rather than being a pre-condition for partnership are more 
likely to be an outcome. Each side can give credible commitments and in doing so 
build trust (Teague, 2001). Social partnership, thus has a dual role, to legitimise 
fundamental social change and confer up-front benefits on companies, employers, 
workers and the public generally. 
 
Under the various partnership agreements a host of bodies, working groups, and task 
forces have been set up (23 under the PPF alone; Turner, 2002). Examples include: 
 
 NESF (1993)-inequality and long term unemployment 
 NESC (1996)-membership widened to include the voluntary sector 
                                                 
2 The EWC Directive, for example, though weak, may allow the Europeanisation of national systems of 
corporate governance 
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 Local Authority National Partnership Advisory Group-supports the 
implementation of workplace partnership in the local government sector in 
Ireland 
 NCPP- Implementing the Health Strategy through Partnership 
 Local Area Partnership on social exclusion and disability 
 Special Inititaives on housing, inflation etc 
 
In all these areas, policy goals are agreed upon and implemented through the use of an 
open method of coordination that supports structures over rules and procedures, 
problem solving over distributive bargaining, and enabling frameworks over binding 
agreements. Throughout the partnership process a clear evolution has occurred 
(O’Donnell and O’ Reardon, 2000); a shift in content (from macroeconomic to 
structural and supply side issues) and method (from high level negotiations to working 
groups, for a, multilevel problem solving). 
 
The Sate, Trade Unions and Social Partnership 
 
This method of policy making has resulted in much changed roles for the social 
partners and the government. For what O’ Riain (2000) has termed the ‘flexible 
developmental state’, the important role is to: 
 
 nurture post fordist frameworks of production and innovation,  
 attract foreign direct investment and, 
  link local and global networks to promote development.  
 
The state does not directly drive development, but shapes the capacity of the society 
and market to do so through its ‘midwife and husbandary’ role; by creating ties 
between flexible state agencies (that are independent but accountable) and business 
and other market actors. The state’s role, then, is to monitor, facilitate, and to aid 
communication between and among interest groups.  
 
This new role for the state, like the partnership model itself, is not without its critics. 
O’ Cinneide (1998) has argued that ‘participation and consultation’ effectively means 
that policy making is not conducted in the open in Dail Eireann by elected 
representatives, but by organised interests behind closed doors. He gives the example 
of Area Development Partnerships under the PESP, which involved the social 
partners, representatives of state agencies and voluntary and community 
organisations, but no elected local representatives (ibid: 47). He argues that the social 
partnership model is unconstitutional, because it involves a shift in power from 
elected representatives to full time officials and interest groups, who present the 
agreements as a fait accompli to the legislature. 
 
There has also been a profound shift in the role of the unions (Goetschy, 2000). The 
pacts have demanded that the unions act to: 
 
 justify major societal changes to their grassroots (welfare reform, more 
flexible labour markets etc),  
 to imbue thier members with a real culture of patience and educate them about 
the links between different sets of claims (wage restraint and job creation for 
example), 
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 at local level, union reps need to shift from negotiation  to consultation; the  
stock in trade of continental unions. This requires force of argument /technical  
competence as opposed to ‘muscle’ 
 
Again, this new role has been the subject of some fierce criticism. Allen (2001) has 
argued that the SP structures have provided a political, industrial and ideological 
framework through which a neo-liberal agenda could be pursued. He is particularly 
critical of the unions who, he argues, have allowed deregulation of all items of 
national economy except pay; where workers exercise wage restraint in exchange for 
getting ‘a say’ in policy-making.  
 
How have the unions fared under social partnership3?  
 
Positives: 
 
 The genuine fear of a Thatcherite attack on trade unionism was a major factor 
in entering partnership. This has not occurred and indeed, the prestige of the 
ICTU has been enhanced by the process; access to political arena regularised 
and institutionalised 
 Economic boom and full employment 
 Increased membership 
 Widening of bargaining agenda beyond pay and conditions 
 
Negatives: 
 
 Concern that while top-level (horizontal) links have developed, linking 
structures below peak level (vertical links) are weak 
 Increased inequality 
 Falling density 
 Question as to the legitimacy of unions to negotiate public policy in certain 
areas (educational disadvantage, waste management etc) 
 
Union attitudes 
 
Survey evidence (Geary and Roche, 2002, D’Art and Turner, 2002) suggests: 
 
 Social partnership has benefited employers and the government more than 
workers 
 Union effectiveness at national level showed little change 
 The effectiveness of workers own union at the workplace had declined 
 
Interview Data 
 
“I actually think, there’s an irresistible argument in favour of social partnership… 
But, I think what we have is not social partnership, it’s the old-fashioned national 
wage agreements, with a whole heap of other stuff that you’d need a career break to 
                                                 
3 Arguments around the merits and demerits of partnership would require far more space than is 
available here to even outline, never mind assess. The above merely represent a few of the more oft-
quoted. 
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even read… it’s very aspirational, and it’s very, kind of, ‘the equality we all want, and 
eliminate discrimination and disabled people have been treated shamefully… But 
when it comes to changing the damn thing, when it comes to making buses that 
disabled people can get on and off, I don’t see too many of them around” 
(MANDATE official4) 
 
“What we want, what the unions want…is a civilised relationship, decent working 
conditions and not sort of war, war, war everyday. What employers want is peace, 
industrial peace…and what government want is industrial peace and they don’t give a 
shite much after that what happens to anybody, as far as I can see. So we don’t all 
want the same things” (MANDATE official) 
 
“I do think…that centralised bargaining as its called has damaged involvement to a 
great extent. I mean, every three years you get a bit of paper and you stick yes or you 
stick no on it (as most of our members do), and you hop it in the box. And to a great 
extent that’s the height of your involvement with social partnership” (MANDATE 
official) 
 
“Has there been an impact on union management relations from partnership? 
Not really any different... I’d question if there’s any change under partnership”(IBOA 
member5) 
 
“How do you view the national partnership deals? 
The way I view it we got hammered in 1992 by the bank SO partnership has been 
beneficial to us. It, at least, guaranteed SOME rise to cover the cost of living. The 
union mightn’t have been as strong on its own. Maybe I’m wrong…”(IBOA member) 
 
 
“the downside is that…the improvements that we can point to are appreciated by the 
people who pay attention to these, like economists or politicians or fellas like 
yourself, or meself but I don’t know if the vast majority of the members see it that 
way. Somehow, I think that they don’t…being able to point backwards and simply say 
‘well, you know, we were part of the Celtic Tiger that created this’. I think people go 
‘ahh, sure that wasn’t you at all, that was the government’… for instance, say the tax 
concessions. We would very deliberately negotiate them. You can see, anybody can 
see this. But when somebody gets their new tax cert it doesn’t say ‘as negotiated by 
the TUM’. And the vast majority of our members, they don’t relate to that at all.” 
(SIPTU official6) 
 
IR environment 
 
There has never been an anti-union public policy in Ireland, the union’s legitimacy 
has not been challenged by any political party (even the PDs), and public attitudes to 
unions generally are extremely positive (O’ Kelly, 2000). However a crucial factor in 
the Irish story is the importance of foreign direct investment (FDI), and in particular 
US MNCs. 
                                                 
4 MANDATE have been traditionally hostile to SP 
5 Traditionally supportive of partnership, the IBOA has voted overwhelmingly to reject Sustaining 
Progress 
6 SIPTU have been supportive of SP 
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Employer resistance/union avoidance: 
 
 Up to 1980s IDA pushed a pro-union policy (‘sweetheart deals’) 
 NOW, Ireland sold as non-union environment, legal intervention in IR ruled 
out as endangering inward investment 
 MNCs (especially in hi-tech sectors) more likely to not recognise unions 
 1990s evidence suggests a broader diffusion of union avoidance to Irish and 
other foreign, non-US firms, and in a broader range of industrial sectors 
(Gunnigle et al, 2002) 
 Labour Court recommended recognition in 75/81 cases-compliance in 30% of 
these (far below the compliance rate for other disputes; ibid.) 
 
Enterprise Partnership: Chapter 9 of Partnership 2000 was devoted to the need to 
develop partnership at the workplace level. ICTU encouraged its affiliates to move 
away from an adversarial IR model towards a new role as ‘business partners’ 
committed to quality improvement. The importance of workplace partnership for 
unions must be stressed. In an era of declining union penetration, the TUM has had to 
seek mechanisms to increase their legitimacy at both enterprise and national level 
(ICTU, 1995) 
 
 P2000 and PPF-defined EP and identified 9 particular areas (work 
organisation, financial involvement, life long learning etc) 
 However, the evidence to date suggests little has been achieved (Guinnigle, 
1997; Roche, 2000). Operational partnership (union/employee involvement in 
management decisions regarding issues like work organisation) tends to 
predominate over strategic partnership (providing for union/employee 
involvement in top level corporate decision-making)   
 The penetration and depth of partnership and workplace innovation in Ireland 
is extremely limited (ibid.). In unionised workplaces, the findings indicate that 
unilateral management decision-making remains the most common approach 
to handling change, and management prerogative and collective bargaining 
combined by far predominate over collaborative production 
 
Interview Data 
 
“How do you feel about partnership? Is there a workplace partnership agreement 
here? 
How do you mean?” (IBOA member) 
 
“Is there a workplace partnership agreement here?  
How do you mean? 
A deal negotiated with management by the reps here, for this workplace? 
No. We come in, work our asses off and go home at night.” (IBOA rep) 
 
(refers to recent case he dealt with) “…a company with family friendly policies-she 
couldn’t go from full time to part time so she could mind her newborn child. Couldn’t 
even get an answer from the employer…a year later, she had to say ‘well, fuck ya, I 
have to go and mind the child, stick your job.’ When I see that, I think ‘social 
partnership, where is it? I’d love it. Please, show it to me.’” (MANDATE official) 
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Conclusions 
 
The social partnership model appears to be under stress. O’ Donnell (2001) has 
catalogued a series of problems facing the participants. This paper has attempted to 
outline that partnership has involved a shift to a new form of problem-solving 
governance and policy making, that relies on coordination and ‘soft law’. This paper 
has focused on the implications of this for trade unions. The (tentative) evidence to 
date is not encouraging; the success of the union leadership in ‘selling’ this new 
approach to their members is in question. The quote from the SIPTU official above, 
for example, illustrates the problem of democratic accountability. In the ‘deliberative 
governance’ model many policies arise from administrative agencies, bodies, task 
forces etc (including unions) that are independent of representative political 
structures. However, while certain properties of deliberative governance are 
emerging, people still measure acceptability/legitimacy against the ‘majoritarian’ 
principles of parliamentary democracy (Teague, 2001). It is for the union leadership 
(and social partners) to outline the benefits and advantages of the more subtle form of 
governance outlined above. 
 
The section above described how there is a real danger of the union elite becoming 
divorced and distant from its membership; there is clear evidence of growing rank-
and-file disenchantment with the partnership process (indeed there has always been a 
significant majority opposed to partnership-Sustaining Progress has passed with much 
rancour and significant dissent). It has been suggested that an important factor in this 
is the failure to establish meaningful partnership structures at enterprise level-to make 
partnership concrete for the rank and file. This is turn has been linked to evidence of 
increased employer resistance and union avoidance.  
 
This takes us back to where we started; the Anglo-Saxon voluntarist IR system. 
Although there seems a genuine desire among many of the Irish IR actors to move 
away from adversarialism, there is an inherent contradiction in the government, Janus-
like, offering unions a seat at the top table, and then pursuing an industrial policy that 
makes it extremely difficult for unions to recruit at company level7. There has been a 
significant shift towards a ‘Europeanisation’ of Irish IR, but the issue of union 
recognition remains key. Even the UK now has legislation on mandatory union 
recognition; until Irish unions can achieve the level of workplace institutionalisation 
that is common to most other EU nations, the contradictions inherent in the 
partnership strategy will continue to manifest themselves. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 For example, the Irish government, while espousing its support for enterprise partnership at the same 
time joined with the British in opposing the Information and Consultation Directive, which seeks to 
ensure employees are kept informed of developments affecting their work/company.  
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